From False Paternalism to False Equality:  Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895 by Olsen, Frances
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 84 Issue 7 
1986 
From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on 
Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895 
Frances Olsen 
University of California at Los Angeles 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Legal 
History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, 
Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518 (1986). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol84/iss7/8 
 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
FROM FALSE PATERNALISM TO FALSE 
EQUALITY: JUDICIAL ASSAULTS ON 
FEMINIST COMMUNITY, ILLINOIS 
1869-1895 
Frances Olsen* 
Feminist theorists seem to be obsessed by the question of whether 
women should emphasize their similarity to men or their differences 
from men. In discipline after discipline, the issue of sameness and dif-
ferences has come to center stage. 
This focus is not a new phenomenon. Early this century, suffrag-
ists fluctuated between claiming that it was important to let women 
vote because they were different from men - more sensitive to issues 
of world peace, the protection of children, and so forth - and claim-
ing that it was safe to let women vote because they would vote the 
same way men did. 1 
In law, this obsession with sameness and difference has taken the 
form of a debate between formal equality for women and substantive 
equality for women - or between so-called "equal treatment" and so-
called "special treatment."2 The contemporary question of maternity 
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1. See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1497, 1576 (1983); B. HARRISON, SEPARATE SPHERES 81, 84 (1978). 
2. On the general question of equal treatment versus special treatment, see Finley, Tran-
scending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Co LUM. L. 
REv. 1118 (1986); F. Olsen, The Sex of Law (1985) (unpublished manuscript; on file at the 
Michigan Law Review); Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS 
L. REv. 387 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Olsen, Statutory Rape]; Williams, The Equality Crisis: 
Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982); Kay, 
Models of Equality, 1985 u. ILL. L. REV. 39. 
"Special treatment" is a term of derision used by proponents of "equal treatment" or formal 
1518 
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benefits offers a good example. Currently, a number of feminists seem 
to be opposing one another regarding state policy on this issue. 3 On 
one side, many feminists support maternity benefits:4 current employ-
ment policies seriously disadvantage women who have children - and 
specifically disadvantage women who get pregnant and give birth. 5 
Feminists point out that virtually every Western industrialized nation 
has some form of maternity benefits and argue that the United States 
should also. Obviously, childbirth and child nurture are essential to 
the continuation of society, and it is absurd for individual women to be 
expected to bear the entire cost and burden, when society in general 
benefits. Some feminists concede to their opponents that maternity 
benefits violate formalistic notions of equality but support them none-
theless; formalistic equality may be fine for upper-class and profes-
sional women, they argue, but working-class women - which means 
most women .,.-- need maternity benefits more than they need some 
abstract notion of equality. Some feminists also argue that although 
maternity benefits may seem to treat pregnant women as a "special 
class," this "special treatment" . is necessary in order for women to 
have an equal opportunity in the marketplace. 6 Moreover, the lack of 
adequate maternity leave can be said to reinforce the ideology that 
paid work is primarily for men and that women are marginal workers 
equality. For want of a better alternative, I shall generally use the more neutral term "different 
treatment." 
3. See generally Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special 
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985) (defense of equal treatment 
position); Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action 
and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 513 (1983) (special treatment, 
or "positive action," approach). 
Feminists generally agree that parental benefits - nurturing benefits not linked to pregnancy 
or lactation - should be made available on a gender-neutral basis. The most controversial ques-
tion is whether pregnancy disability benefits may differ from other disability benefits. 
4. See generally Krieger & Cooney, supra note 3; Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurispudence, 56 
IND. L.J. 375 (1981); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); 
Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 690 (1983) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, Sexual Equality]; Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929 (1985); Note, Equality in the Workplace: Is That 
Enough for Pregnant Workers?, 23 J. FAM. L. 401 (1984-85); Kay, Equality and Difference: The 
Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex 
Differences into Account, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 699 (1986). 
5. See Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 
59 B.U. L. REV. 55 (1979). 
6. See Brief Amici Curiae of Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace et al. at 
32-45, California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, No. 85-494, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 783 
(1986) (involving pregnancy disability leave); Krieger & Cooney, supra note 3, at 544-47; Note, 
Sexual Equality, supra note 4, at 714-21; see also Kay, supra note 4, at 32-34. See generally 
Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Juris-
pudence, 63 OR. L. REv. 265, 304-07 (1984). 
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who should drop out of the marketplace when they begin to have 
children. 
On the other side of the controversy, feminists who question ma-
ternity benefits make spirited arguments against short-run expediency 
and opportunism.7 They claim that gender-specific maternity benefits 
are a snare and a delusion -just like the so-called "protective" labor 
legislation that excluded women from well-paying jobs during much of 
this century. These feminists link current gender-specific maternity 
leave with the "romantic paternalism" of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries - a romantic paternalism that relegated women to 
their own "separate sphere" and placed them on a pedestal that turned 
out to be a cage. So too, they argue, will maternity benefits wind up 
hurting women. In particular, any form of mandatory employer-paid 
benefits will give employers too strong an incentive to circumvent 
present equal-employment laws in order to avoid hiring women of 
childbearing age. Moreover, opponents of maternity benefits argue, to 
single out pregnancy for special treatment - instead of providing a 
leave or other benefit to any worker who needs one - undermines 
working-class solidarity and reinforces the ideology that women are 
primarily childbearers and nurturers, and only secondarily workers. 
This debate is sometimes conducted as though the issues had never 
come up before. Other times, participants in the current debate cite 
two early United States Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate the 
risks of paternalism and the importance of formal equality for women. 
In 1873 Bradwell v. lllinois 8 held that states could bar women from 
becoming lawyers, because the practice of law was not among the fed-
eral "privileges and immunities" protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. In 1908, Muller v. Oregon 9 let stand a law limiting the work 
hours of women, just three years after the Supreme Court had rejected 
as "paternalistic" similar legislation that would have limited men's 
hours. 10 The history of gender-specific legislation raises more compli-
cated and interesting questions than often recognized regarding pater-
nalism and equality. A consideration of this history suggests the 
dangers of antipaternalism as well as the dangers of paternalism and 
the limitations as well as the virtues of formal equality. A more care-
7. See Williams, supra note 3, at 325; Williams, supra note 2. Opponents of maternity bene· 
fits worry that community concern with mothering can slip into paternalism; supporters worry 
that too formalistic a concept of equality can degenerate into the kind of selfish individualism 
that is associated with laissez-faire capitalism. 
8. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
9. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
10. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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ful look at this history may shed useful light on the maternity benefits 
debate and on other controversies. 
This essay will examine the "equal treatment" versus "special 
treatment" for women issue as it arose in Illinois in the late nineteenth 
century. In 1869 the Illinois Supreme Court barred Myra Bradwell 
from the practice of law on the basis that she was a married woman, 
and in 1870 it reaffirmed its exclusion of women in In re Bradwell, 11 
the state decision the United States Supreme Court upheld in Bradwell 
v. Illinois. 12 This denial of equal treatment to women, especially the 
concurring opinion by United States Supreme Court Justice Bradley, 
appears to many to represent paternalism at its worst: the interest that 
individual, exceptional women might have in practicing law must give 
way to the community's interest in maintaining women's separate 
sphere of home and family.13 
A quarter century after it had decided Bradwell and thirteen years 
before the United States Supreme Court decided Muller v. Oregon, the 
Illinois Supreme Court seemed to reject paternalism when it struck 
down a portion of protective labor legislation that had provided for an 
eight-hour workday for women in the garment industry. In Ritchie v. 
People 14 the Illinois Supreme Court asserted that a legislatively man-
dated eight-hour day for women violated the rights of working wo-
men, and stated that women were entitled to the same rights as men. 
The direct effect of the Ritchie decision, however, was to undermine 
the efforts of a community of women reformers who were struggling to 
improve working conditions. These reformers had supported the leg-
islation in part to reduce the subordination of women and to promote 
gender equality.15 From the point of view of the women most affected, 
the eight-hour law was not paternalistic, and the formal juridical 
equality promised in Ritchie would be unlikely to improve their work-
ing conditions. 
I present a version of the events surrounding these two Illinois 
cases - Bradwell and Ritchie - to illustrate a way of looking at issues 
11. 55 Ill. 535 (1869). The Illinois Supreme Court issued its written opinion early in 1870. 
See 2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 146 (1870). The court dated its opinion September Term, 1869, but 
published it with the opinions from the September 1870 term, stating that "[t]his application was 
finally heard and determined at the September Term, 1869, but was unavoidably omitted from its 
proper place in the report of the cases decided at that term." 55 Ill. 535, 535 n.*. Several other 
Illinois reporters from the same period have opinions seemingly out of order in a similiar man-
ner. See, e.g., Illinois Reports vols. 50, 51, 54 & 56. 
12. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
13. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. at 139-42 (Bradley, J., concuriing). 
14. 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895). 
15. See generally M. TAX, THE RISING OF THE WOMEN: FEMINIST SOLIDARITY AND 
CLASS CONFLICT, 1880-1917 (1979). 
1522 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1518 
of equality and paternalism. In the nineteenth century, as today, the 
choice between equal treatment and different treatment for women 
could not be made in the abstract, but only in context, case by case. 16 
Gender-blind policies as well as gender-conscious policies can facili-
tate and perpetuate the subordination of women. Similarly, both kinds 
of policies can reduce the subordination of women. An emphasis on 
the choice between gender-blind policies and gender-conscious policies 
misfocuses attention. The particular context and meaning of policies 
are almost always more important than whether the policies specifi-
cally take gender into account. 
Like equality, paternalism can be evaluated only in the particular 
contexts that determine its meaning. Paternalism recognizes the im-
portance of the relationship between people, but it often assumes and 
ratifies an inequality within the relationship. A rejection of this ine-
quality, under the rubric of antipaternalism, can run at least two risks: 
First, it may deny the importance of human relationship and treat peo-
ple as isolated individuals. Further, antipaternalism may pretend an 
equality between people that does not actually exist. This pretense of 
equality may facilitate the continuation of actual inequality - for ex-
ample, by encouraging an unrealistic faith in freedom of contract.17 
16. This position is sometimes misinterpreted to be opportunistic or unprincipled. For exam-
ple, a similar argument that I made in Olsen, Statutory Rape, supra note 2, at 398-400, was 
recently characterized to be: "[O]nly the result matters - if it is good for women, as women 
define what they want, then the rationale is ultimately unimportant." Dowd, supra note 4, at 740 
n.212. This position was called "fundamentally inconsistent with the notion of a legal system." 
Id. (characterizing argument of Sherry, Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: De-
mocracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 13 GEO. L.J. 89, 98-102 (1984)). 
I do not agree that only the result, not the rationale, matters - even "[f]rom a practical 
perspective." Dowd, supra note 4, at 740 n.212. Nor do I believe that the only way women can 
obtain change from the legal system is "to articulate the principles legitimizing equality goals." 
Id. The idea that women should decide ''what they want" and then "articulate .•• principles" to 
justify trying to get what they want from the legal system assumes a radical separation between 
what women want and the principles upon which women can justify what they want. The justifi-
cations and rationales affect what women conclude will be good for them, and any justifications 
and rationales that ignore the question of what would be good for women must be hollow and 
abstract indeed. 
If we are to value principled decisionmaking, then "principled" must surely mean more than 
being able to come up with an abstract, general rule that will achieve the desired result in most 
cases. There is nothing unprincipled about trying to improve the lives of women. 
The appeal to a broad abstract principle is too often an effort to avoid acknowledging and 
confronting some important moral and political choice. Abstractions do not constitute an ethical 
alternative to serious decisionmaking. See generally Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligations: Legiti-
mation Theory and Civil Disobedience, 18 GA. L. REV. 929 (1984). 
17. See generally Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution 
on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399 (1984) (warning that freedom of contract for 
divorcing couples may result in agreements that ratify and perpetuate the inequality between 
husband and wife). 
Also, paternalism may assume or pretend a relationship that does not exist and may be an 
aspect of what I have referred to as "forced community." See Olsen, Statutory Rape, supra note 
2, at 393-94; see also id. at 389 n.7. 
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I propose to evaluate decisions from the point of view of the people 
most directly affected by the issues. From this perspective, I argue 
that the paternalism of the Bradwell case - refusing to let women 
practice law - was a false paternalism. I also argue that the equality 
of the Ritchie case - throwing out the eight-hour day for women -
was a false equality. 
I. FALSE PATERNALISM: THE BRADWELL CASES 
After the Civil War, a number of women began to apply for 
licenses to practice law. At that time in the United States, one could 
be admitted to the bar by reading law in a law office and demonstrat-
ing one's proficiency to the court.18 Myra Bradwell, like many of the 
other women who wanted to become lawyers, had read law in a rela-
tive's law office - in Bradwell's case, her husband's.19 Many of the 
young men who ordinarily would have been helping out in the law 
offices while they read to become lawyers were off fighting the war. 
The absence of young men may have contributed to the willingness of 
male lawyers to have their wives and daughters come into their of-
fices. 20 Like "Rosie the Riveter" of World War II, many women who 
filled in at "men's jobs" wanted to keep working after the war ended. 
Having read law in a relative's office, women then wanted to become 
lawyers.21 
In 1869, Myra Bradwell applied to the Illinois Supreme Court for 
a license to practice law. The court did not question her professional 
qualifications, but refused her admission to the practice of law on the 
basis of her status as a married woman. Initially the court did not 
issue a formal written opinion but directed the clerk to notify Bradwell 
of its decision by letter - a letter which Bradwell promptly pub-
18. In Illinois, for example, an applicant for a license to practice law was supposed to present 
"to any member of this court a certificate of qualification, signed by the Circuit Judge and State's 
Attorney of the circuit in which the applicant may reside, setting forth that the applicant has 
been examined and found qualified .... " Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 76, quoted in 2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 145 
(1870). 
19. See 1 THE BENCH AND BAR OF ILLINOIS 278 (J. Palmer ed. 1899) [hereinafter cited as 
BENCH AND BAR]; Robinson, Women Lawyers in the United States, 2 THE GREEN BAG 10, 14 
(1890). 
20. Cf. Robinson, supra note 19. The relationship between the Civil War and women enter-
ing the legal profession was first suggested to me by Carol Latham of the University of Wisconsin 
Law School. Bradwell herself was active in Civil War relief work and probably did not begin 
studying law until the end of the war. See BENCH AND BAR, supra note 19, at 278. In any 
event, the Civil War is likely to have raised the expectations of many women who worked at a 
variety of war jobs - nursing, serving on a sanitary commission and so forth. These raised 
expectations may account for the number of women entering or seeking to enter law. 
21. Shortly after the war women also began to seek and occasionally obtain admission to law 
schools. See Part II infra. 
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lished.22 At common law, married women were said to be under "cov-
erture," or under the protection of their husbands. Before legislatures 
enacted reform statutes known as Married Women's Property Acts, a 
husband owned all the family property; a married woman could not 
own property and was unable to enter into contracts on her own be-
half. 23 The justices of the supreme court apparently believed that 
under Illinois law a married woman would not be able to enter into 
contracts with her clients and therefore could not practice law.24 
Bradwell responded with a brief to the court in which she 
presented strong arguments that the Illinois Married Women's Acts of 
1861and1869, which allowed women to own property and to control 
their own earnings, enabled women to enter and be bound by contracts 
to the extent required to practice law.25 The court then issued a writ-
ten opinion in which it acknowledged that it had ignored the effect of 
the 1869 Act and, without conceding the contract-disability point, re-
sorted to a discussion of legislative intent.26 The court concluded that 
"the sex of the applicant, independently of coverture," was "a suffi-
cient reason for not granting the license."27 Although the statute em-
powering the supreme court to license attorneys did not "expressly 
require" the exclusion of women, the court asserted that the admission 
of women "was never contemplated by the legislature."28 In Illinois, at 
the time the licensing statute was passed: "That God designed the 
sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men 
to make, apply and execute laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic 
22. See 2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 145 (1870). The letter that Norman L. Freeman, the Illinois 
Supreme Court Reporter, sent to Myra Bradwell, in October 1869, said in part: 
The court instruct me to inform you that they are compelled to deny your application for a 
license to practice as an attorney-at-law in the courts of this State, upon the ground that you 
would not be bound by the obligations necessary to be assumed where the relation of attor-
ney and client shall exist, by reason of the disability imposed by your married condition - it 
being assumed that you are a married woman. 
Id. (emphasis deleted). 
23. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES§§ 7.1-7.2, 
at 219-29 (1968). A few states did not adopt these common law rules but instead followed com-
munity property principles, under which a husband and wife are joint owners of property. See 
generally id.; W. REPPY & c. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-11 
(1982). 
24. See In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 53S-37 (1869). The court may also have been deeply 
affected by the concept of coverture and have found it fanciful to contemplate a married woman 
becoming a lawyer, quite aside from her inability to form contracts. 
2S. SS Ill. at S36-37; 2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 14S-46 (1870). On the appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court, Bradwell's attorney argued also that the court's supervisory power over attor-
neys made attorney-client contracts unnecessary. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
130, 136 (1872). 
26. SS Ill. at S36-38. 
27. SS Ill. at S37. 
28. SS Ill. at S38. 
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truth. It may have been a radical error, but that this was the universal 
belief certainly admits of no denial."29 Regardless of the "individual 
opinions" the justices might have with respect to the admission of wo-
men to the bar, the court asserted that it did not deem itself at liberty 
to exercise its power to license attorneys in a mode "never contem-
plated by the legislature":30 
For us to attempt, in a matter of this importance, to inaugurate a 
practice at variance with all the precedents of the law we are sworn to 
administer, would be an act of judicial usurpation, deserving of the grav-
est censure. If we could disregard, in this matter, the authority of those 
unwritten usages which make the great body of our law, we might do so 
in any other, and the dearest rights of persons and property would be-
come a matter of mere judicial discretion.31 
The court claimed to "entertain a profound sympathy" with efforts 
"to reasonably enlarge the field for the exercise of woman's industry 
and talent."32 "If the legislature shall choose to remove the existing 
barriers, and authorize us to issue licenses equally to men and women, 
we shall cheerfully obey."33 Until then, the court would not allow 
Myra Bradwell to practice law. 
Myra Bradwell engaged Senator Matthew Hale Carpenter - a 
family friend and a famous constitutional lawyer - to appeal her case 
to the United States Supreme Court.34 He obtained a writ of error 
from the Court on August 16, 1870, and presented oral argument Jan-
uary 18, 1872.35 The Court ruled against Bradwell on April 15, 1873, 
the day after the Court rendered its decision in the famous Slaughter-
House Cases. 36 In both cases the majority held that the "privileges 
29. 55 Ill. at 539. 
30. 55 Ill. at 539. 
31. 55 Ill. at 541. The court illustrated its position by drawing a comparison to the court-
made practice of transferring title to a wife's property to her husband upon their marriage. The 
courts created this rule but, according to the Illinois Supreme Court, a change in the rule could 
properly come only from the legislature - as with the enactment of the Married Women's Prop-
erty Acts - not through the courts. See 55 Ill. at 540. 
32. 55 Ill. at 541-42. 
33. 55 Ill. at 542. The court also suggested that it would trust to women's good sense and 
sound judgment to practice in those areas oflegal practice suitable to them. Although the court's 
"cheerfully obey" language may sound like deference to the legislature, the deference could also 
be seen as a form of footdragging. 
34. See H. KOGAN, THE FIRSf CENTURY: THE CHICAGO BAR AssOCIATION, 1874-1974, at 
28 (1974). 
35. See 2 E. STANTON, s. ANTHONY & M. GAGE, HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 614-15 
(1882). 
36. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The decision in the Slaughter-House Cases was announced 
April 14, 1873. See 6 c. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES 
1349 (1971). Bradwell was announced April 15. See id. at 1364. E. Bruce Thompson has as-
serted that Bradwell followed the Slaughter-House Cases by two days. See E. THOMPSON, MAT-
THEW HALE CARPENTER: WEBSTER OF THE WEST 102 (1954). Babcock, Freedman, Norton & 
Ross assert that Bradwell was scheduled to be handed down at the same time as Slaughter-House, 
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and immunities" clause of the fourteenth amendment did not limit the 
power of states to control and regulate activities that states had tradi-
tionally regulated, such as the licensing of attorneys. 
The Slaughter-House Cases upheld a Louisiana state law regulating 
the slaughter of livestock in and around New Orleans against a chal-
lenge by independent butchers who argued that the law would put 
them out of work. The legislation required all butchering to be carried 
on in a single slaughterhouse, run by a private corporation, and re-
quired the corporation to provide space to all comers at prices fixed by 
the legislature. 
The Slaughter-House decision raised important questions of judi-
cial restraint and federalism. The idea that courts could threaten the 
people's liberty was important to many people at this time - just as it 
had been important to the justices of the Illinois Supreme Court in the 
Bradwell case. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the United States Supreme Court and most other courts were gener-
ally regarded as more conservative than legislatures. Judicial restraint 
was thus not the conservative doctrine that it seems to be today but 
was a doctrine largely advocated by liberals. 37 
The federalism issue played a somewhat more complicated role. 
The fourteenth amendment reflected and ratified the Civil War victory 
of the Union over the Confederate States. Yet, in the Slaughter-House 
Cases, John Campbell, a famous Southern Confederate lawyer who 
might have been expected to support states' rights against federal en-
croachment, represented the independent butchers and opposed the 
state legislation, which had been passed by a carpetbag legislature in 
Louisiana. Campbell lost the Slaughter-House Cases for the butchers, 
but he won for Southern Confederates both a weakened fourteenth 
amendment and a relatively activist Supreme Court. 38 
The Unionists who argued in favor of the state legislation in the 
Slaughter-House Cases included Matthew Carpenter, the lawyer who 
represented Myra Bradwell. The Unionists were interested in limiting 
but was actually announced the next day." B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & s. Ross, 
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 8 (1975). Several sources refer 
to the decisions as having been made in May, 1873. 
37. For somewhat later, striking examples of liberals advocating judicial restraint, see the 
opinions of Justice Brandeis in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 264-
67 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), and of Judge Learned Hand in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk 
Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929). The classic statement is Oliver Wendell Holmes' dissent in 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905). 
38. See Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of the Slaughter-House Cases (pts. 1 & 2), 18 
TuL. L. REv. 1, 78-88 (1943), 18 TUL. L. REv. 218 (1943). The case was activist insofar as it 
asserted a pivotal role for the courts in enforcing the fourteenth amendment rather than treating 
the amendment as primarily enabling federal legislation. 
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judicial review, not in supporting states' rights against federal en-
croachment; and along with their other arguments, they attempted to 
support the state legislation as a health measure, clearly within the 
police power of the state.39 Had the Slaughter-House decision been 
based upon a reasonably broad understanding of police power instead 
of upon a narrow interpretation of the privileges and immunities 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court could more 
easily have decided in favor of Myra Bradwell. The Court might then 
have had to face the question of whether the police power enabled 
Illinois to bar women from the practice oflaw. As it was, the majority 
of the United States Supreme Court - five Justices - held that 
Bradwell was governed by the Slaughter-House Cases and turned 
Bradwell down because they thought the issue should be decided by 
the state legislature, not by the federal courts. 40 
Four Justices dissented in the Slaughter-House Cases and asserted 
that courts should play a more active role; they claimed to be con-
cerned with the ways in which legislatures (not courts) posed a threat 
to the people's liberty.41 These four Justices argued that courts should 
protect citizens against legislation that infringed basic rights, such as 
the right to work. An activist judiciary that will protect the rights of 
minorities sounds good to many feminists and liberals today; but the 
main "minority" the judicial activists of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries seemed to worry about was not women or people 
of color, but the minority of wealthy people. A common interpreta-
tion is that the Slaughter-House dissenters wanted to protect the rich 
against the leveling tendencies of the democratic majority.42 When 
39. From this perspective, there was little or no inconsistency between the position Matthew 
Hale Carpenter took opposing the independent butchers and his position in support of Bradwell. 
Justice Bradley opposed Carpenter's position on both cases. 
40. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137-39 (1873). The attorney who represented 
Bradwell before the U.S. Supreme Court, Matthew Hale Carpenter, had also represented the 
State of Louisiana's side against the independent butchers in the Slaughter-House Cases, so that 
his victory in the the Slaughter-House Cases seems to have contributed to his defeat in Bradwell. 
41. See 83 U.S. at 83-111 (Field, J., dissenting) (Justices Swayne and Bradley and Chief 
Justice Chase joining Field's opinion); 83 U.S. at 111-24 (Bradley, J., dissenting); 83 U.S. at 124-
30 (Swayne, J., dissenting). 
42. The plight of the independent butchers in the Slaughter-House Cases may seem to pro-
vide a counter-example to the statement in the text. One might well feel sympathy and concern 
for these displaced workers and their families, who hardly seem like rich people being protected 
against any leveling tendencies of a democratic majority. Most of them were even Gascons, 
Louisianians of French ancestry who on occasion were subjected to anti-Gascony sentiment not 
unlike racism. See Franklin, supra note 38, at 34 & n.110. 
Yet, it would seem important to recognize also that the independent butchers constituted a 
closely organized group which may well have conspired to keep newcomers out of the butchering 
trade and to keep meat prices high. See id. Moreover, the ability of the butchers to work was not 
at stake in these cases. The legislation that required all slaughtering to take place in a single 
slaughterhouse, and thus created a monopoly, also required the corporation that operated the 
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_these four Justices finally became a majority of the Court, they began 
what has come to be known as the Lochner era, throwing out as un-
constitutional one reform measure after another.43 
At the time the Bradwell appeal was decided, these four Justices 
were a minority. Only one of them - Chief Justice Chase - took a 
position that twentieth-century feminists would support. He dissented 
from the majority opinion44 and presumably would have ordered the 
state of Illinois to let Myra Bradwell practice law. The other three 
Justices - Justices who claimed to believe courts should protect indi-
vidual rights - disagreed with Chief Justice Chase. They sided with 
the majority in refusing to grant relief to Bradwell, 45 but they dis-
agreed with the majority's reasons. The concurring opinion of these 
three Justices, written by Justice Bradley, is the obnoxious sexist opin-
ion so frequently quoted: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide 
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. 
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and 
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently 
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the 
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as 
in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which prop-
erly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, 
nofto say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should be-
long, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopt-
ing a distinct and independent career from that of her husband .... The 
slaughterhouse to provide butchering space to everyone at prices set by the legislature. See 83 
U.S. at 40, 42; Brief for the Defendants, reported in 21 L. Ed. 395, 401. The independence of the 
butchers, their status as entrepreneurs rather than mere workers or "wage slaves," may well have 
been an important aspect of what was at stake. See Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: 
Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767, 776-77. The famous short tele-
gram by which Matthew Carpenter, one of the attorneys who represented the state-created mo-
nopoly, notified his clients in New Orleans of their victory in the case reflects this attitude toward 
the monopolistic tendencies of the independent slaughterers: "The banded butchers are busted." 
Ashley, Matthew Carpenter as a Lawyer, 1 W. VA. BAR 197, 199 (1894). 
In fact, however, it would seem that at least some of the banded butchers were not busted. 
The displaced slaughterers had formed a corporation among themselves and, on March 15, 1871, 
joined forces with the state-created monopoly. A motion was made but denied to dismiss the 
Slaughter-House Cases as moot on the basis that the original parties to the lawsuit had reached 
an agreement after the case went to the Supreme Court. See Franklin, supra note 38, at 225 & 
nn.230-31. 
43. The era received its name from the 1905 case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905). For general discussions of the Lochner era, see E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST Gov-
ERNMENT 149-53 (1948); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTI· 
TUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 221-37 (1976); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-6, 427-50 (1978); B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 
How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 110-253 (1942); D. Kennedy, The Rise 
and Fall of Classical Legal Thought (October 1975) (unpublished manuscript; on file at Michigan 
Law Review). 
44. See 83 U.S. at 142. 
45. 83 U.S. at 139-42 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and be-
nign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.46 
II. THE COMMUNITY OF WOMEN LAWYERS 
The reluctance of courts to admit women to the practice of law 
may well have slowed the process of women becoming lawyers, but it 
could not keep the legal profession all male. In state after state, 
courts' refusals to admit women were followed by organizing efforts 
culminating in legislation specifically permitting women to join the 
profession. 47 
While it is of course always difficult to know how seriously to take 
such judicial expressions, it is interesting to note that the Illinois 
Supreme Court in Bradwell stated: "Of the qualifications of the appli-
cant we have no doubt, and we put our decision in writing in order 
that she, or other persons interested, may bring the question before the 
next legislature."48 If the court was not serious, it should have known 
better than to issue such an invitation. Myra Bradwell edited a widely 
read law weekly in Chicago, and she had not only lobbied for but had 
herself drafted the bill of 1869, extending the scope of the Married 
Women's Act of 1861.49 
While Bradwell's appeal to the United States Supreme Court was 
pending, a young unmarried woman named Alta M. Hulett qualified 
for the bar and was refused admission. With Myra Bradwell's assis-
tance, Hulett shepherded a reform bill through the legislature granting 
women substantially equal employment rights with men. 50 Hulet~ and 
Bradwell's bill, passed on March 22, 1872, was later quoted in the 
Ritchie case to justify overturning the gender-specific eight-hour-day 
legislation.51 The bill took effect on July 1, 1872, nine and a half 
months before the United States Supreme Court decided Bradwell. 
46. 83 U.S. at 141. 
47. See Robinson, supra note 19; see also In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 34 N.E. 641 (1893), 
quoted at note 89 infra. The Federal Act of February 15, 1879, made women eligible to practice 
before the United States Supreme Court. Act of Feb. 15, 1879, ch. 81, 20 Stat. 292. 
48. 55 Ill. at 536. Writing in 1890, Myra Bradwell characterized this statement as a sugges-
tion by the court that the legislature should act. See 22 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 264 (1890). 
49. See 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 212 (1869); see also id. at 172. 
50. See H. KOGAN, supra note 34, at 28-29; Robinson, supra note 19, at 15-16. 
51. See Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 112, 40 N.E. 454, 458 (1895). When Susan B. Anthony 
went to the election polling place and tried to cast her ballot - before women were allowed to 
vote - she was arrested and prosecuted for interfering with an election, a federal offense. The 
law under which she was prosecuted had been enacted after the Civil War to discourage white 
terrorist disenfranchisement of the newly freed black men. See M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 
159 (1977). We recognize that in prosecuting Susan B. Anthony the state officials were misusing 
the law; we do not conclude that we made a mistake in passing the statute - that no matter how 
wise it looked when it was enacted, the statute was really a snare and a delusion. 
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Myra Bradwell never reapplied to the bar but continued to edit her 
influential weekly newspaper, The Chicago Legal News. 52 On June 4, 
1873, Alta Hulett became the first woman lawyer in Illinois.53 
In 1890, a lawyer named Lelia Robinson wrote a biographical and 
professional description of all the women lawyers she could find in the 
United States. 54 To gather material for her article, Robinson under-
took extensive correspondence, writing to the deans of law schools55 
and to every woman lawyer for whom she could find an address.56 
Her article describes several small, loosely knit communities of women 
lawyers, the largest and most formal of which was the Equity Club. 
The Equity Club was formed at the University of Michigan Law 
School in the fall of 1886 by five of the seven women students then in 
attendance and two alumnae who lived in town. It developed into a 
correspondence club open to all women law students and lawyers. By 
1890 it had forty members and published an Equity Club Annual, con-
sisting of letters from the members. 57 
In August 1893, the Law Department of the Queen Isabella Club 
held a three-day meeting in Chicago. Women lawyers presented pa-
pers on topics ranging from the Bradwell case and the Populist Move-
ment to "Women Lawyers in Ancient Times." A paper on Sunday 
closing laws written by Elizabeth Cady Stanton was to be "probably 
.. read by another." Those present formed a National League of 
52. In 1890, a few years before her death in 1894, the Illinois Supreme Court admitted Ms. 
Bradwell to the bar on its own motion. See 22 CHI. LEGAL.NEWS 263 (1890). Bradwell was also 
admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court on March 28, 1892. See 26 CHI. 
LEGAL NEWS 296 (1894). 
53. Interestingly, Hulett may also have been the youngest person to become a lawyer in 
Illinois. She joined the bar on her nineteenth birthday. Males did not reach the age of majority 
until twenty-one, and the court suggested that minors would not be allowed to practice law. See 
2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 145 (1870) (Freeman's letter to Bradwell, quoted at note 22 supra) ("Appli-
cations [to the bar] have occasionally been made by persons under twenty-one years of age, and 
have always been denied upon the same ground - that they are not bound by their contracts, 
being under a legal disability in that regard."). Women achieved their majority at age eighteen. 
See text at note 93 infra. 
54. Robinson, supra note 19. 
55. Id. at 11. Many law schools, including Harvard, Yale, and Columbia, refused to admit 
women. In 1886, however, Yale had granted a Bachelor of Laws degree to one woman, Miss 
Alice R. Jordan, who had studied a year at Michigan and then gone to Yale for a year. Shortly 
thereafter the Yale University Catalogue provided, "It is to be understood that the courses of 
instruction above described are open to persons of the male sex only, except where both sexes are 
specifically included." 1886-87 YALE U. CATALOGUE 24. According to the dean of the law 
school the paragraph was intended "to prevent a repetition of the Jordan incident." Robinson, 
supra note 19, at 12-13. 
Other law schools did admit women. The University of Michigan, for example, admitted 
Miss Sarah Kilgore in 1870 and granted her a degree in 1871. By 1890, Michigan had graduated 
more women than any other law school in the country. Id. at 17. 
56. See id. at 11. 
57. See id. at 17. 
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Women Lawyers. 5s 
Some of these early women lawyers specialized in fields such as 
juvenile crime, that were unthreatening to men, and may have enjoyed 
a "remarkably smooth arrival into a professional middle class."59 For 
others the arrival was a bit more rocky.60 Whether they remained 
within "[t]acit, mutually accepted limits"61 or went beyond such lim-
its, a number of these women lawyers struggled to advance the inter-
ests of women and of society in general. 62 
Ill. PATERNALISM VERSUS SOLIDARITY 
Bradley's opinion in Bradwell is often referred to as "paternalis-
tic, "63 but this seems to me to be a mischaracterization. The concur-
rence may well have treated Bradwell as a subordinate, and it did 
overrule her own decision to practice law; but it did not control 
Bradwell in a fatherly or caring manner. No serious claim could be 
advanced that Justice Bradley was trying to promote Myra Bradwell's 
58. 25 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 451 (1893); see also id. at 421. 
59. R. WEIBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 122-23 (1967). Weibe asserts that the trickling 
admission of women into law was a less important advance than women's entry into professions 
such as teaching and social work. He also argues that the "token integration" of women into law 
was greeted by their male colleagues with "a warm sense of paternal tolerance." Id. 
60. See Equity Club Annual (available at the Schlessinger Library, Radcliffe College, Cam-
bridge, Mass.); Robinson, supra note 19, at 17. 
61. R. WEIBE, supra note 59, at 123. 
62. See Robinson, supra note 19. The issue is of course complicated. For example, Myra 
Bradwell would certainly be listed among the women lawyers who struggled for social reform 
and tried to expand the roles available to women. See, e.g., Minow, "Forming Underneath Every-
thing That Grows:" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 819, 840-51. Yet 
Bradwell also printed racist jokes in the Chicago Legal News. See 24 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 294 
(1891); see also id. at 141. She warmly endorsed the reelection ofillinois Supreme Court Justice 
Benjamin Magruder shortly after he upheld, in The Anarchists' Case (Spies v. People), 122 III. 1, 
12 N.E. 865, error dismissed, 123 U.S. 131 (1887), the popular but legally dubious convictions of 
the Haymarket anarchists. See 21 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 315 (1888). By the time Magruder issued 
his opinion, September 14, 1887, (dated "September 15" in the Illinois Reporter), the public 
hysteria that had initially followed the Haymarket bombing had subsided, and many progressive 
and pro·labor people were deploring the unfairness of the trial and asserting that the anarchists 
had been convicted for their beliefs. See P. AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY 300-12 
(1984). In her endorsement, Bradwell appeared to refer to the Anarchists' Case when she compli-
mented Magruder's "decisions within year" for making "every citizen within the great State of 
Illinois feel that ... his life and property is a little safer, that law and order will be preserved." 
21 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 315 (1888). John Peter Altgeld, Illinois' reform governor, based his par-
don of the Haymarket anarchists on his conclusion that the initial trials were grossly unfair and 
illegal. J. ALTGELD, REASONS FOR PARDONING FIELDEN, NEEBE AND SCHWAB (Chicago 
1893). Not long after Altgeld's pardon, Magruder decided Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 
454 (1895), which overturned a pro-labor measure Altgeld supported. 
63. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opin-
ion); Lewis v. Cohen, 417 F. Supp. 1047, 1054 (E.D. Pa. 1976), vacated sub nom. Lewis v. 
Cowen, 547 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060, 1061 (D. Mont. 
1975), revd., 532 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976); Smith v. City of E. 
Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1138 (N.D. Ohio 1973), ajfd. in part and revd. in part sub nom. 
Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976). 
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true best interests. Bradley favored overruling Bradwell's choice not 
for her sake but rather to advance other goals. 
The stance taken by Bradley seems to me to be no more paternalis-
tic than Petruchio in Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew. When he 
was trying to "tame" his new wife Katharina, Petruchio starved her 
and kept her in rags. He did it by sending away the food and clothing 
as "not good enough" for her.64 We do not say he was being paternal-
istic; he was being disingenuous. 
When men claim that policies that harm women have been enacted 
for their own good, women may find it easier simply to condemn the 
policies as "paternalistic" without disputing the factual claim that the 
policies would be good for women. There is less resistance to an ab-
stract complaint of "paternalism" than there would be to a serious 
discussion of the actual effects the policies advanced could be expected 
to have on the lives of women. A major problem with taking this easy 
route of condemning "paternalism" is that it tends to disable us from 
our own efforts at collective action. 65 Whenever people try to bring 
about change they are likely to employ policies that depart from iso-
lated individualism. Any attempt we make to act together to improve 
our lives can be labeled paternalistic. 
A good example of this problem arises with protective labor legis-
lation. Historically, women have often supported such legislation. 
From as early as 1790 workers in the United States were demanding a 
shortened workday. The ten-hour workday was won through general 
strikes in 1835, although it was then lost in the depression of 1837-
41. 66 In 1844, the first unions for factory workers in the United States 
-Female Labor Reform Associations-joined with male workers to 
petition legislatures to enact ten-hour laws. As a result of their efforts, . 
ten-hour laws were passed in New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and 
64. See W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW, act iv, scenes i & iii. Some would 
argue that Petruchio's overall plan to "tame" his wife was indeed intended to be for her own 
good and thus classically paternalistic. My point here is a narrower one. When Petruchio sent 
the food and clothing away he was not attempting to obtain better food and clothing but inten· 
tionally depriving Katharina of food and clothing. Whether the deprivation was supposed to be 
for her own long-range good is another question. 
65. This easy feminist talk against "paternalism" is like easy feminist talk against "outmoded 
stereotypes." Women make a mistake and "giv[e] up the battle," Polan, Toward a Theory of Law 
and Patriarchy, in THE PoLmcs OF LAW 294, 300 (D. Kairys ed. 1982), when they soothe 
feelings and try to limit conflict by pretending that various negative views of women were once 
acceptable but are now "outmoded." Such easy talk of "outmoded stereotypes" also slips one 
into the position of categorically denying that "outmoded stereotypes" have any current factual 
accuracy. By basing their attack on the falseness of a stereotype, women make it more difficult to 
admit the partial truth of some stereotypes and to work to end that partial truth. See generally 
Olsen, Statutory Rape, supra note 2, at 428 n.197. 
66. See P. FONER, MAY DAY 8-9 (1986). 
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Maine. Employers, however, were able to insert provisions into the 
laws that permitted longer hours by special contract, and workers who 
refused to agree to such special contracts were fired and often black-
listed.67 Illinois passed an eight-hour bill in 1867, but this law also 
provided an exception when there was a "special contract to the con-
trary," and was therefore of little or no effect.68 In the 1880s ten-hour, 
six-day workweeks were standard, and working days were often twelve 
to fifteen hours long. 
Without an eight-hour law or strong labor unions, most workers 
had to work long hours or lose their jobs. Individually, a worker did 
not have the choice of working only eight hours a day. Poor pay and 
competition from other workers forced individual workers to work 
longer hours than they wanted to. The eight-hour movement was an 
effort to limit this competition so that no one would be forced to work 
longer than eight hours. In an important sense, it was a form of 
solidarity. 69 
The charge - made by conservative courts during the Lochner era 
- that all protective labor legislation is paternalistic is false. Most 
protective labor legislation can be better understood as a form of col-
lective action. It does not prevent workers from doing what they want 
to do; rather, it enables workers to do what they want - to work 
fewer hours for more pay and under better conditions. 70 
Protective labor legislation helps workers by limiting competition. 
But when so-called protective labor legislation applies to only one 
group of workers - for example, only to women - it sometimes 
ceases to have this effect. It may help only men workers by limiting 
the competition of women but not improve working conditions in gen-
eral.71 When women were first entering the job market in large num-
bers, before men and women competed for the same jobs, protective 
labor legislation tended to improve work conditions, whether it ap-
67. See id. 
68. Eight Hour Law, ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 48, §§ 1-2 (Hurd 1885). 
69. See generally Altgeld, The Eight-Hour Movement, in THE PROGRESS OF LABOR 37 (A. 
Beatty ed. 1892). 
70. For the most interesting, though I believe mistaken, liberal argument that protective la-
bor legislation of general application is paternalistic, see Shilfrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and 
Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1161 (1983) (arguing, in opposition to Ronald Dwor-
kin, that "[a] major argument of the state in defending the law at issue in Lochner was that 
anyone who wanted to work more than ten hours in a bakery had an inadequate conception of 
the good life; that it was, in fact, a dangerous life"). 
71. It is well known that "protective" labor legislation was used at times in the twentieth 
century to keep women out of certain desirable jobs. See J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION 
(1978). Less well known is the support that some male unionists who were opposed to women in 
the work force gave to the concept of equal pay for equal work, with exactly the same goal of 
keeping women out of desirable jobs. See A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK 156 (1982). 
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plied to men and women or just to women. 72 When, however, men 
and women were in job competition, gender-specific legislation could 
be and sometimes was used to exclude women or to hurt them vis-a-vis 
men, rather than to improve conditions for all workers. To call such 
legislation "paternalistic" misses the point. What is wrong with such 
legislation is not that it takes away or overrules, assertedly for her own 
good, a woman's choice to work longer hours, but rather that the leg-
islation will not improve work conditions. The legislation sacrifices 
women's choices for the benefit of men and reduces women's options 
instead of expanding them. The effect of gender-specific labor legisla-
tion depends entirely upon the particular context in which it is en-
acted. It cannot be judged a priori. 
IV. THE COMMUNITY OF WOMEN REFORMERS 
In Illinois in the late nineteenth century there was broad-based 
support for protective labor legislation, especially among women. In 
1888, thirty women's groups formed the Illinois Women's Alliance, a 
cross-class coalition that included trade unions, women's clubs, suf-
frage groups, temperance unions, and professional groups. 73 The con-
stitution of the Illinois Women's Alliance stated as among its goals: 
"to agitate for the enforcement of all existing laws and ordinances that 
have been enacted for the protection of women and children"; "[t]o 
secure enactment of such laws as shall be found necessary"; and "to 
investigate all business establishments and factories where women and 
children are employed."74 Although Hull House was not a member of 
the Illinois Women's Alliance, Jane Addams, Florence Kelley, and 
other residents of the famous settlement house worked very effectively 
for many of the same goals. 
This coalition of women secured passage in 1893 of a bill to outlaw 
sweatshops and regulate working conditions in the garment industry.75 
Section five enacted the eight-hour day for women working in "facto-
ries or workshops."76 Section nine provided for the appointment of a 
72. See Brandeis, Labor Legislation, in J. COMMONS ET AL., 3 THE HISTORY OF LABOR JN 
THE UNITED STATES 1896-1932, at 397 (1935); see also THE CASE FOR THE FACTORY ACTS 209 
(S. Webb 2d ed. 1902) (England); E. CADBURY, WOMEN'S WORK AND WAGES 36-43 (1907) 
(England); E. BAUER, THE NIGHT-WORK OF WOMEN JN INDUSTRY 38 (1903) (Switzerland). 
73. See M. TAX, supra note 15, at 66-68. 
74. Newspaper clipping, box 4, vol. 2, Thomas J. Morgan Papers (November 1888) (available 
at University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana), quoted in Sklar, Hull House in the 1890s: A 
Community of Women Reformers, 10 SIGNS: J. WOMEN JN CULTURE & SOCY. 658, 665 (1985). 
75. See Sklar, supra note 74; M. TAX, supra note 15, at 25-89. 
76. After an extensive investigation of the sweatshop system, the Illinois legislature enacted 
in 1893 a bill entitled, "An Act to regulate the manufacture of clothing, wearing apparel, and 
other articles in this State, and to provide for the appointment of State inspectors to enforce the 
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chief factory inspector, an assistant factory inspector, and ten deputy 
factory inspectors, "five of whom shall be women."77 Florence Kelley, 
who had drafted the bill, was named chief factory inspector. She gath-
ered around her a group of committed deputies, several of them social-
ists, and undertook rigorous enforcement of the law.78 The 
community of women reformers at Hull House became the center of 
enforcement activities. 
Although the effects of gender-specific legislation may be difficult 
to evaluate, the available evidence suggests that in Illinois in 1893, the 
eight-hour day for women did not exclude them from jobs or hurt 
women vis-a-vis men. Instead, it tended to secure the eight-hour day 
for all workers. The work done by men and by women was separate 
but interrelated in a manner that made it difficult not to limit men also 
to eight hours.79 Kathryn Kish Sklar, who is preparing a biography of 
Florence Kelley, has concluded that Kelley and her staff probably 
adopted a deliberate policy of extending the eight-hour day de facto to 
men.8° Kelley wrote to Friedrich Engels on New Year's Eve, 1894: 
We have at last won a victory for our 8 hours law. The Supreme Court 
has handed down no decision sustaining it, but the Stockyards magnates 
having been arrested until they are tired of it, have instituted the 8 hours 
day for 10,000 employees, men, women and children. We have 18 suits 
pending to enforce the 8 hours laws and we think we shall establish it 
permanently before Easter. It has been a painful struggle of eighteen 
months and the Supreme Court may annul the law. But I have great 
hopes that the popular interest may prove too strong.st 
Whether there was insufficient popular support for the law or whether 
the court was unmoved by public sentiment, Kelly's hopes were dealt 
same, and to make an appropriation therefor." Act of June 17, 1893, 1893 Ill. Laws 76 
(Bradwell). Section 5 of the act provided: "No female shall be employed in any factory or 
workshop more than eight hours in any one day or forty-eight hours in any one week." Act of 
June 17, 1893, 1893 Ill. Laws 76, 77 (Bradwell). , 
77. Act of June 17, 1893, 1893 III. Laws 76, 77 (Bradwell); see Ritchie v. People, 155 III. 98, 
40 N.E. 454 (1895). 
78. See Sklar, supra note 74, at 671 (letter from Florence Kelley to Friedrich Engels, Nov. 
21, 1893). 
79. See id. at 675. Interestingly, it was a gender-neutral provision of the law, not a gender-
specific one, that probably did benefit men at the expense of some women, at least in the short 
run. The act outlawed child labor and the manufacture of garments in tenement dwellings, 
which tended to move manufacturing work out of the sweatshops and into the factories. Men 
held about 75% of factory jobs, while women and children did most of the work in sweatshops. 
See Sklar, supra note 74, at 672-75. 
80. See id. at 675; see also K. SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE FEMALE WORLD OF 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1830-1930 (forthcoming). 
81. Letter from Florence Kelley to Friedrich Engels (Dec. 31, 1894), quoted in Sklar, supra 
note 74, at 675. Florence Kelley began correspondence with Friedrich Engels in 1884, when she 
decided to translate his classic work, CONDITION OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS IN 1844 
(1887). Kelley's was the only English translation until 1958. See Sklar, supra note 74, at 661 n.8. 
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a setback by the Illinois Supreme Court in Ritchie v. People.82 
V. FALSE EQUALITY: THE RITCHIE CASE 
A group of employers organized the Illinois Manufacturers Alli-
ance (which became the model for the National Association of Manu-
facturers)83 for the explicit purpose of obtaining a court ruling against 
the eight-hour day provision of the sweatshop act. 84 In their internal 
organizing efforts, they made it clear that they feared the eight-hour 
day for women would be the opening wedge for the eight-hour day for 
everyone. 85 
The Illinois Manufacturers Alliance was successful, and in 1895 
the Illinois Supreme Court in Ritchie v. People declared the law uncon-
stitutional - as a violation of due process and women's rights. The 
language was stirring. Justice Magruder wrote for the court that "wo-
man is entitled to the same rights, under the constitution, to make 
contracts with reference to her labor as are secured thereby to men."86 
He referred to the United States Supreme Court case of Minor v. Hap-
persett87 as holding that a woman was both a "person" and a "citizen" 
within the meaning of the first section of the fourteenth amendment: 
As a citizen, woman has the right to acquire and possess property of 
every kind. As a "person," she has the right to claim the benefit of the 
constitutional provision that she shall not be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law .... The law accords to her, as to 
every other citizen, the natural right to gain a livelihood by intelligence, 
honesty and industry in the arts, the sciences, the professions or other 
vocations. Before the law, her right to a choice of vocations cannot be 
said to be denied or abridged on account of sex. 88 
82. 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895). 
83. See Sklar, supra note 74, at 674; Papers of the Illinois Manufacturers Association, Chi-
cago Historical Society [hereinafter cited as IMA Papers]. 
84. See Minutes, August 24, 1893, IMA Papers, supra note 83, at box 1, folder 1 (1893). The 
organization originally went by the name Illinois Manufacturers Protective Association. At its 
second meeting the organization dropped the "Protective" from its name. The minutes of the 
organization do not reflect whether that change was motivated by a concern that it might seem 
ingenuous for the Illinois Manufacturers Protective Association to be arguing that protective 
labor legislation was ill-advised and paternalistic. See Minutes, August 29, 1893, IMA Papers, 
supra note 83, at box 1, folder 1 (1893). 
85. This view of the Illinois Manufacturers Association appears in many sources in its pa-
pers. It is particularly apparent in its opposition to a later proposal for the eight-hour day for 
women. See Pamphlet opposing the Eight-Hour Day, IMA Papers, supra note 83; Letter from 
Secretary of the Illinois Manufacturesrs Association to William J, Brown, April 17, 1909, id. at 
box 161, Folder 1 (1909); see also Brief of Plaintiffs in Error at 61, Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 
40 N.E. 454 (1895) (arguing against eight-hour law that it "necessarily forces a reduction of the 
hours of work of the male co-laborer"). 
86. Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 111, 40 N.E. 454, 458 (1895). 
87. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875). 
88. Ritchie, 155 Ill. at 112, 40 N.E. at 458. 
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Magruder cited with approval In re Leach, an 1893 case from Indiana 
that disagreed with Illinois' Bradwell decision and held that women 
could not be barred from practicing law in Indiana. 89 Magruder 
continued: 
The tendency of legislation in this State has been to recognize the rights 
of women .... An act approved March 22, 1872, entitled "An Act to 
secure freedom in the selection of an occupation," etc., provides that "no 
person shall be precluded or debarred from any occupation, profession 
or employment (except military) on account of sex."9o 
Moreover, Magruder found it irrelevant that the Act of March 22, 
1872, made an exception for military service and provided "that noth-
ing in the Act shall be construed as requiring any female to work on 
streets, or roads, or serve on juries." Magruder argued that the ques-
tion before the court was "whether, in an employment which is con-
ceded to be lawful in itself and suitable for woman to engage in, she 
shall be deprived of the right to determine for herself how many hours 
she can and may work during each day."91 Finally, in an antipaternal-
istic vein, Magruder asserted that it was "questionable" whether the 
police power of the state could ever "be exercised to prevent injury to 
the individual" worker or instead could be exercised only to promote 
the broader interests of society or the public. 92 
Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that the court's lan-
guage had any beneficial effect on the actual conditions of women. 
Women in Illinois did not enjoy formal juridical equality; for example, 
the age of majority for females was eighteen, for males twenty-one.93 
89. 134 Ind. 665, 34 N.E. 641 (1893). Leach was a more difficult case for the woman appli-
cant than Bradwell The Indiana statute provided: "Every person of good moral character, be-
ing a voter, on application, shall be admitted to practice law in all the courts of justice:" 134 Ind. 
at 666, 34 N.E. at 641 (emphasis added). Women were not allowed to vote in Indiana, but the 
court decided that the statute did not limit their right to practice law in the state. The court did 
not refer to the Bradwell case by name, but the reference is unmistakable. 
We are not unmindful that other States, notably Illinois, Wisconsin, Oregon, Maryland, and 
Massachusetts, have held that in the absence of an express grant of the privilege [to practice 
law] it may not be conferred upon women. In some instances the holding has been upon 
constitutional provisions unlike that of this State, and in others upon what we are con-
strained to believe an erroneous recognition of a supposed common law inhibition. However, 
each of the States named made haste to create, by legislation, the right which it was sup-
posed was forbidden by the common law, and thereby recognized the progress of American 
women .... 
134 Ind. at 668, 34 N.E. at 642. 
90. 155 Ill. at 112, 40 N.E. at 458. Justice Magruder was referring to the bill passed by the 
efforts of Myra Bradwell and Alta M. Hulett. See text at notes 50-51 supra. 
91. 155 Ill. at 113-14, 40 N.E. at 459. 
92. 155 Ill. at 114, 40 N.E. at 459. 
93. See Sayles v. Christie, 187 Ill. 420, 437, 58 N.E. 480, 485 (1900); Stevenson v. Westfall, 
18 Ill. 209, 211 (1856). The discrimination that such legislation represents and the harm it can 
cause women are suggested in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-17 (1975) (forbidding Utah to 
enforce different ages of majority for males and females). Of course, a lower age of majority may 
also benefit women in some cases. See, e.g., note 53 supra. 
1538 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1518 
Nor did women enjoy equality in the workplace. Jobs were segregated 
by sex, and women were paid considerably lower wages than men.94 
Court opinions in Illinois were not particularly pro-women. Although 
child custody law was thought to be better for women in Illinois than 
in some other states, Justice Magruder in one case took one of a 
mother's two sons away from her because she worked.95 On the topic 
of married women's rights, Illinois was barely less grudging than any 
other state in its enforcement of statutory reform.96 
Meanwhile, the actual effect of the Ritchie case was to overturn a 
law that was supported by women and seemed to be operating for their 
benefit. It was not until thirteen years later, when the United States 
Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon 91 upheld a general ten-hour day 
for women in Oregon, that a serious split among women developed on 
the issue of gender-specific hours legislation.98 Even then, the actual 
effect of Oregon's ten-hour law was more good than bad, and it was 
only a scattering of voices that objected or believed that there was an 
important risk that the measure would work to disable women vis-a-
vis men.99 Most commentators saw the ten-hour law upheld in Muller 
as an opening wedge - just as the Illinois Manufacturers Alliance saw 
94. See REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE "SWEAT 
SHOP" SYSTEM, TOGETHER WITH A TRANSCRIPT OF THE TESTIMONY TAKEN BY THE COMMIT-
TEE (Springfield, m. 1893). 
95. See Umlauf v. Umlauf, 128 Ill. 378, 21 N.E. 600 (1889). The identity of the individual 
justice who wrote an opinion would seem to have been particularly important at this time in 
Illinois judicial history. The Supreme Court met in three different cities during the year, and 
relatively little consultation took place among the various justices. Each case was assigned to an 
individual justice to write a draft opinion without the court having heard oral argument and 
usually, if not always, prior to any discussion of the case by the court. The draft opinion usually 
became the final opinion, and dissents were rare. One of the justices, responding to a complaint 
from the bar that the Illinois Supreme Court was issuing "single judge opinions," suggested that 
"many opinions" would be revised after the court discussed the case: "[Q]uite often (opinions] 
are re-written more than once." Carter, The Supreme Court and its Method of Work, I ILL. L. 
R.Ev. 151, 153 (1906); see also Woodward, The "One-Judge Opinions" of our Supreme Court 
(Editorial Note), I ILL. L. R.Ev. 392 (1906); Correspondence, Comment on Mr. Justice Carter's 
Defense of the Supreme Court's Method of Work, I ILL. L. REV. 273 (1906). 
96. See, e.g., Snell v. Snell, 123 Ill. 403, 14 N.E. 684 (1888). I would not want to discount 
possible ideological benefits of Magruder's opinion. His decision could play a role in constituting 
a more juridically equal regime. Formal equality, which often benefits women, can be and some-
times is advanced by judicial assertions that women are equal to men and have equal rights to 
men. On the other hand, Magruder's opinion may also have ideological disadvantages: formal 
equality could be a setback and discredited by decisions that hurt women in the name of equality. 
97. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). I have benefited from reading unpublished manuscripts, including 
S. Levin, The Protection Paradox: The History of Protective Labor Legislation for Women, 
1780-1930; D. Gelon, Muller v. Oregon: A Feminist Decision (July 1, 1985). 
98. See Lehrer, Protective Labor Legislation for Women, 17 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 187, 
187 (1985). 
99. See, e.g., Against Justice Brewer's Decision, 25 WOMAN'S TRIBUNE 19 (1908); Unjust to 
Working Women, 25 WOMAN'S TRIBUNE 17 (1908); Harding, Pertinent Queries, 25 WOMAN'S 
TRIBUNE 19 (1908); Special Legislation for Women, 25 WOMAN'S TRIBUNE 16 (1908); Harding, 
Male Socialism, The Woman's Standard, Apr. 1908, at 2, col. 2. 
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the eight-hour day in Illinois.100 Gender-specific legislation, legiti-
mated in Muller v. Oregon, was later used to exclude women from 
desirable jobs, 101 but that does not mean that the Ritchie case was 
right. The equality promoted in Ritchie v. People was a false equality. 
Gender-based labor legislation has complex and ambiguous impli-
cations. The conservative judicial attack on protective legislation of 
general application and the standard arguments in favor of laissez-
faire usually assert that protective labor legislation is bad for society 
and that it does not really help its intended beneficiaries. Muller v. 
Oregon admitted what Lochner v. New York had tried to deny - that 
protective labor legislation can benefit the protected workers and soci-
ety in general. Protective labor legislation - even if it is limited by its 
terms to women - "delegitimates" the autocratic power of employers 
and legitimates the basic notion that social controls on the market-
place are appropriate.102 
Yet, protective labor legislation limited to women may also offer 
ideological support to the proponents of laissez-faire. By identifying 
protective labor legislation with the special problems and disabilities of 
women, gender-specific legislation may make protective legislation 
seem unmanly. Muller v. Oregon can be read to support the assertion 
that protective legislation is paternalistic. Women were more often 
than men considered to be appropriate beneficiaries of paternalism. 
Finally, in those fields in which men and women did compete, gen-
der-specific legislation might well exclude rather than benefit women. 
Thus, the failure of such legislation to protect its supposed benefi-
ciaries in these particular cases could reinforce the argument that such 
legislation in general does not protect the workers it is supposed to 
benefit. Moreover, insofar as gender-specific labor legislation pits men 
against women, it may undermine working-class solidarity and thus 
reinforce the power of the employers. 
The 1893 sweatshop bill would likely have been considerably more 
controversial if section five had enacted the eight-hour day for men as 
100. See text at note 85 supra. 
101. See J. BAER, supra note 71. 
102. Historically, altruism has been linked with hierarchy - a hierarchy that places women 
below men. In the nineteenth and again in the twentieth century, when women demanded equal-
ity they by and large used a marketplace model of equality and allowed the equality claim to be 
linked with assertions of individualism. Women were not only seeking both equality and inde-
pendence at approximately the same time, but in many ways their demand for equality was based 
upon (or dependent upon) their claim to be independent. See Olsen, supra note 1. 
Within liberal society, notions of contractual freedom and autonomy play an important role. 
Women's ability to form contracts was contested and important. It may be that the social and 
political meaning of the notion of freedom of contract was significantly different as applied to 
women than as applied to men in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
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well as for women. Limiting the reform to women may well have 
seemed politically necessary. Once a reform is accepted, it may be 
possible to extend its coverage to men.103 
Writing in 1924, Florence Kelley justified gender-specific labor leg-
islation against claims that it violated women's rights to equality with 
men. She wrote: 
The struggle for every gain in statutes and judicial decisions for women 
and girls in industry has been hard fought and costly in money, time and 
effort. 
[Women's] oldest, most wide-spread, and most insistent demands 
have been for seats, for more adequate wages, and short, firmly regulated 
working hours .... Whenever union men feel no need of laws, well and 
good. No one wishes to interfere with them any more than professional 
women are interfered with today by labor legislation. 104 
If they were not able to enact gender-specific labor legislation, accord-
ing to Kelley, "women could change their hours and other working 
conditions by law only when men were ready and willing to make the 
changes for themselves. This would be a new subjection of wage-earn-
ing women to wage-earning men, and to that subjection we are op-
posed on principle and in practice."1os 
As long as women were segregated into different jobs from men, it 
was not very meaningful to insist that labor legislation apply equally 
to both sexes. As women were slowly allowed to work at "men's 
jobs," these women would no longer benefit from or desire protective 
legislation unless it applied to men as well as to women. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The parallel that feminists who question maternity benefits draw 
103. See Brandeis, supra note 72. 
104. Kelley, Why Other Women Groups Oppose the Amendment, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, 
Mar. 24, 1924, at 19, 164-65. 
105. Id. For a more recent statement in a similar vein, consider the testimony opposing the 
Equal Rights Amendment in 1970, given by Myra Wolfgang, vice-president of the Hotel and 
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO: 
My concern is for the widowed, divorced mothers of children who are the heads of their 
families and earn less than $3,500 a year working as maids, laundry workers, hospital clean-
ers, or dishwashers .... 
Representing service workers gives me a special concern over the threat that an equal 
rights amendment would present to minimum labor standards legislation •••. I am sure you 
are aware that many such laws apply to women only . 
. . . Should women workers be left without any legislation because of State legislature's 
failure and unwillingness to enact such legislation for men? 
The ''Equal Rights" Amendment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments 
of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), quoted in WOMEN AND THE 
"EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT" 91-93 (C. Stimpson ed. 1972). 
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between maternity benefits and protective labor legislation is more apt 
than supporters of maternity benefits often acknowledge. The argu-
ments now being advanced to support maternity benefits are very simi-
lar to those that were advanced to support protective labor legislation. 
The arguments were generally persuasive then, and they are generally 
persuasive now. 
Brandeis' brief in Muller v. Oregon spent two pages establishing 
that men and women were not in job competition and that protective 
labor legislation would therefore not hurt wqmen vis-a-vis men. Ini-
tially, protective legislation limited to women tended to bring their 
wages and working conditions up to the level of men's. 106 When this 
situation changed and protective labor legislation was used to exclude 
instead of to benefit women, it became important to change or elimi-
nate the gender-specific legislation. 
Pregnancy disability leave seems at this time to be an important 
employee benefit for women. In time, this situation could change. 
Even now, it would probably be better to have a broader leave policy 
that would cover a wide variety of reasons for leaving work. It may 
tum out to be important that the government, not individual employ-
ers, bear the costs of maternity benefits. We should approach the 
question of maternity benefits as a collective process of working out 
and describing desirable ends. We should not try to endorse either 
equal treatment or different treatment as any kind of overarching 
principle. 
This analysis has more general implications regarding the issue of 
sameness and differences and the question of whether women should 
emphasize their similarity to men or their differences from men. Men 
should be neither a model nor a contrast. Women should not have to 
claim to be just like men to get decent treatment, nor should they have 
to focus on their differences from men to justify themselves whenever 
they demand a policy different from the present treatment afforded to 
men. Women can be hurt by false paternalism and by false equality. 
We should not let these concepts divide us. We can and should ad-
vance the concrete interests of society through feminist organizing and 
through building coalitions with other groups - beginning from a 
base of feminist solidarity. 
106. See Brief for Defendent in Error at 82·84, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (the 
"Brandeis Brief"). Louis Brandeis was also one of the signers of the more conventional brief 
filed in the case on behalf of the State of Oregon. See Brief for the State of Oregon, Muller v. 
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
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